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This paper deals with fragmentation both theoretically and empirically. Not only it presents a 
picture of the existing literature on the field but it also provides some basic hints for future 
investigation. It pays particular attention to the possible theoretical dichotomy between 
fragmentation and agglomeration, whilst supplying empirical evidence in support of their 
coexistence. Moreover, the paper focuses on the linkages between fragmentation and trade, 
with an emphasis on vertical intra-industry trade in intermediates. Eventually, the contribution 
stresses that much more attention should be paid on how fragmentation shapes the role of 
industrial districts within the international organisation of production. Further investigation 
from different strands of literature (GVCs and GPNs) is needed to shed some light on the role 
of local production systems in the global architecture of manufactures. 
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In the early '90s, Jones and Kierzkowski (1990 [17]) introduced a new concept, known as \frag-
mentation", to study the dynamics of the international organisation of production. This ap-
proach considers the growth of a ¯rm limited by the rise of marginal costs. To prevent from a
slow expansion, and eventually a halt to the growth of a ¯rm, the manufacturing process would
then be subdivided into vertically integrated blocks, linked through service activities, such as
logistics, communication, etc. In times of low transport costs and fewer institutional barriers,
each production block could be located domestically or overseas according to a variety of rea-
sons, i.e. cheap factors of production, market vicinity, oligopolistic behaviours, public incentives
or disincentives, etc. In developing each of these arguments, a new perspective emerged, allow-
ing for a better understanding of both the international organization of production between and
within ¯rms (Ethier, 1986 [13]; Markusen, 1995 [29], 1988 [28], Markusen and Maskus, 2002 [30];
Markusen and Venables, 2000 [32], 1998 [31]) and the rise of trade and international networks
of SMEs.
The term `fragmentation' came up indeed after several attempts of de¯nition. For example,
Feenstra (1998 [14]), introduced the term \disintegration" of the production process across di®er-
ent countries. Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994 [10]) mentioned this phenomenon as a \kaleidoscope
comparative advantage"; Krugman (1996 [26]) used the phrase \slicing the value chain", whereas
Leamer (1996 [27]) preferred \delocalisation" and Antweiler and Tre°er (1997 [5]) \intra-mediate
trade". Arndt (1997 [6]) spoke of \intra-product specialisation"; whereas Dixit and Grossman
(1982 [12]) wrote on \multistage production"; ¯nally Hummels, Rapoport and Yi (1997 [16])
introduced the term of \vertical specialisation".
All these attempts were not of a semantic nature, but rather derived from being fragmen-
tation a very complex phenomenon. In fact, fragmentation can both derive from a subdivision
of an integrated production process of a large MNE and/or from a decision of a number of
SMEs to integrate and coordinate their pieces of production on a larger scale. In this latter
case scholars tend also to use the term \networking", and usually refer to a mix of cooperation
and competition to explain why ¯rms coordinate across their proprietary boundaries other than
through market prices. In either case, the production process is at least partially subtracted
from mere market price considerations and geared towards internal or external planning. The
¯rst case is more frequently studied within the Anglo-Saxons tradition; the second is more akin
to the European experiences; the case of Asia is somehow mixed. To be sure, though, the former
strong di®erences among world regions seemed to have faded in recent years.
To deal with the above complex issues and supply lines for future research, we decided to
structure the paper as follows. Section 1 provides the theoretical foundations of fragmentation,
ranging the from stylised facts of the ¯rst scholarly contributions to the explanation of the core
concepts. Section 1 also includes a brand new way to look at industrial districts, namely the use
fragmentation as a tool to understand how SMEs network locally. Section 2 critically reviews the
empirical literature on fragmentation. Indeed, we ¯rstly isolate those contributions dealing with
fragmentation in Europe and secondly those related to Asia, providing elements of similarity and
dissimilarity. We also stress the tight connection between fragmentation and intra-industry trade
and between fragmentation and vertical intra-industry trade as we take stock of the growing
signi¯cance of vertical specialisation in world trade. Section 3 and Section 4 are extremely
preliminary. Section 3 recalls the key outcomes of the critical reviews provided in Section 1 and
2, in particular by stressing how Europe and Asia experienced di®erent paths of international
fragmentation (either through the Market or through the Hierarchy). Section 4 concludes with
a stimulus for future research by looking at possible intersections and commonalities among the
concepts of fragmentation, Global Value Chains and Global Production Networks.
12 Fragmentation: The Theory
2.1 Some Stylised Concepts
In this Section, we look at the theoretical background of fragmentation. The ¯rst step is to
understand what fragmentation means in the ¯rst place, and then identify the reasons why this
phenomenon is so signi¯cant at global level. Nowadays, trade in parts and components represent
a signi¯cant and increasing part of world trade. To study this particular phenomenon we thus
need to consider `fragmentation' explicitly and explain why, beside being caused by the tendency
of a ¯rm to grow in general, it is sought after to such a great extent. In order to do so we need
to ¯nd a self su±cient economic rationale for it. Figure 1 depicts, from the upper to the lower
level, how ¯rm may move from a vertically integrated production process to a fragmented one.
Initially, the good is processed entirely within a single production block before being o®ered to
consumers. Then, we present examples of fragmentation, from simpler to more complex cases.
Figure 1: Vertically integrated production, fragmentation and service links.
Source: Jones and Kierzkowski (1990 [17])
Clearly, fragmentation may lead to a relatively simple subdivision of production, in which
inputs are processed in a ¯rst production block to become an output that is input for the next
phase, In this perspective, service links are only those needed to connect production blocks, and
not those required to supply the product to the ¯nal market. Indeed, working with di®erent
production blocks implies that intermediates have to be transferred between di®erent manufac-
turing units, thus transport costs are expected. Disregarding weight issues, transport costs will
be higher the greater the distance between the production facilities. Yet, service link costs may
increase due to the need for a more complex coordination between production block, for example
in terms of delivery times, quantities to be manufactured, and technical speci¯cities. The lowest
part of Figure 1 is a clear example of a more complex fragmentation process, in which some
production blocks are in charge for further manufacturing whereas some others merely proceed
to assembly.
To make fragmentation feasible, some conditions are necessary. Firstly, the production pro-
2cess has to be divisible into independent, geographically separated, production blocks. Secondly,
service link costs to connect and coordinate production block activities, do not have to be so
high as to delete the cost advantages arising from a better plant localisation. For this reason, it
is worth looking into the very nature of service links. Some argue that the dramatic reduction
of service link costs, recently achieved thanks to technological advances, is probably the major
cause of fragmentation, especially at international level. Let us see how this argument run.
2.2 From Large to Small: the Disintegration of MNEs
From a MNE perspective it is possible to consider fragmentation as a form outsourcing. Let
us not specify, for the moment, whether this implies a domestic or rather an international
connection. We shall return to this argument later on in this paper.
A comparison between the costs incurred by an integrated ¯rm and those incurred by a
fragmented one, allows understanding the importance of service links in the selection of the
organisational structure and, therefore, why a previously integrated MNE may ¯nd convenient
to subdivide itself into di®erent production blocks. From the demand side, we can relay upon
the long discussed `love of variety', expressed by the well-known Dixit-Stiglitz utility function,
whereas, from the supply side, ¯rms may be assumed to behave in a Chamberlinian monopolistic
way, thanks to the existence of internal economies of scale. Within this framework, typical of
the so called New Trade Theory, it is assumed that fragmentation leads to the emergence of
service links. For the sake of simplicity, it is supposed that such service link costs consist only
in those transportation expenses that are needed to transfer intermediates from one production
block to another. To begin with, transport costs are assumed to be of the iceberg type: i.e.
when shipping a good from one location to another, part of the commodity is lost during the
shipment, as it may happen when an iceberg is moved from cold sees to warmer places. The
loss caused by the shipment is proportional to the amount of good transferred; therefore, service
links show constant returns to scale. Figure 2 depicts this model.
Figure 2: Fragmentation and integration with economies of scale within production blocks.
Source: Jones and Kierzkowski (2005 [18])
IT line indicates transportation costs. It starts from the origin and shows a positive slope.
The absence of any intercept indicates there are no ¯xed costs; whereas the positive slope
implies that costs are proportional to output. For how it is drawn, i.e. as a straight line, there
are also constant marginal costs and constant returns to scale. The OF line, instead, represents
production costs of each manufacturing block. The intercept indicates the presence of ¯xed costs
and, therefore, the possibility of achieving increasing returns to scale within each production
block. The vertical sum of the two lines IT and OF gives the locus TFO, that represents the total
cost of fragmentation for any level of output of a ¯rm. The IF line represents the total costs for
3an integrated ¯rm. It has an intercept on the vertical axis and it has a positive slope too. These
features mean that the integrated ¯rm faces constant marginal costs and has increasing returns
to scale. We suppose that the IF line is always located above the OF line as it is reasonable
to assume that if a ¯rm wishes to minimise its costs, it will locate its production blocks where
marginal costs are lower.
The fragmented line ABC is the locus corresponding to the minimum production costs for
any level of output. Therefore, any ¯rm wishing to minimise overall production costs will choose
not to fragment its production process if it produces as far as Y0. Beyond this threshold, the
¯rm will more conveniently fragment the process.
A change of the initial hypotheses leads to the inclusion of the fragmentation scenario as
depicted in Figure 3. Service link, proxied also in this case by transport costs, are not now
of the iceberg type, but independent from the level of output. Thus a horizontal line, namely
the SL, indicates such costs. Contrary to the previous model, it is here assumed that both the
vertically integrated ¯rm and each production block present constant returns to scale, whereas
transport costs show increasing returns to scale. The IF and OF lines represent the costs of
an integrated ¯rm and the costs of each production block, respectively. Both lines depart from
the origin, thus con¯rming that there are no increasing returns to scale; but the slope shows
the presence of constant marginal costs. The OF line is clearly °atter then the IF, as, given a
certain output, it is reasonable to assume that the disintegrated ¯rm will choose to locate its
production blocks to those places where manufacturing costs are lower. The TFO line, as in the
previous case, refers to the total costs incurred by the ¯rm fragmenting its production, whereas
OBC indicates the locus of minimum costs for any level of production.
Within this scenario, if the output level lies between zero and Y0, the ¯rm will gain from
integration, whereas for higher production levels, fragmentation will be more convenient. The
savings obtained by disintegration the manufacturing process are higher than the costs implied
by the fragmentation itself.
Figure 3: Fragmentation and integration with economies of scale in service links.
Source: Jones and Kierzkowski (2005 [18])
By comparing the Chamberlinian ¯rm model with the fragmentation model, it is obvious
that the initial di®erent hypotheses lead to di®erent results. In the ¯rst case, low output levels
encourage fragmentation, and high production levels encourage integration. In the second case,
instead, fragmentation is induced by higher output levels.
The rationale behind this result depends on the where ¯rms can gain from economies of scale:
i.e. from service links or rather from larger production processes.
Results of both models are instead the same if using a comparative static perspective. Con-
sider, for example, a reduction in the costs of service links. In the ¯rst model, the IT line will
4show a lower slope, thus the TFO line, expressing total costs, is likely to be °atter. Therefore,
the threshold (Y0) that identi¯es which one between fragmentation and integration is cheaper,
moves to the right: the output value that rules out fragmentation increases. Similarly, in the
second model, a lowering of service link costs leads to a drop of the SL line and a downward
parallel move, of the same size, of the TFO line. Through these steps, Y0 shifts to its left,
thus a lower production level is su±cient to prefer fragmentation over integration (Jones and
Kierzkowski, 2005 [18]).
The fragmentation model relies on some debatable hypothesis. The absence of positive corre-
lation between service link costs and the output level is doubtful, even though the assumption of
constant returns to scale within production blocks seems realistic. Jones and Kierzkowki (1990
[17]), in their seminal contribution, took into account the hypothesis that service links may
present increasing marginal costs. This might happen if transportation costs are not completely
independent from the shipped quantity, but rise with the volume of goods to be transferred. For
fragmentation to happen, it is assumed that the sum of marginal costs in the service link activ-
ities with the marginal costs featuring each production block should be lower than the marginal
costs incurred by an integrated manufacturing process. This is reasonable if the localisation of
each production block allows for a signi¯cant reduction in the marginal costs of the fragmented
production block. If considering Figure 3, the SL line should show a positive slope with a con-
sequent increase in the slope of line TFO, too. Such a change will push Y0 to the right, but the
slope of the TFO line should be anyway lower than that of the IF.
2.3 The First Theoretical Background
We need now to consider how fragmentation works when incomes and demand for output of a
product increase within a vertically integrated ¯rm. Such a model is depicted in Figure 4 below.
Figure 4: Costs of service links and costs of production blocks.
Source: Jones and Kierzkowski (1990 [17])
Ray 1 from the origin describes the costs of production when it is undertook in a single
block with constant returns to scale, while segment 2, with vertical intercept 0A, describes
an alternative process in which two di®erent domestic locations are selected to take advantage
of geographic di®erences in various factor costs and productivities. Such a subdivision could
5serve to reduce marginal costs of production through the exploitation of both absolute and
comparative advantages. A Ricardian approach applies when workers in one area of the country
tend to have di®erent skills from those in another area, and the skills required in each production
block di®er so that a dispersion of activity could lower marginal production costs according to
comparative advantage. Alternatively, it might be the case that the production blocks di®er from
each other in the proportions of di®erent factors that are required. Labour-intensive production
blocks would then be better located in regions in which labour is cheaper than capital and
capital-intensive production in regions in which capital is cheaper than labour. This would
be a Heckscher-Ohlin type of comparative advantage. A Smithian perspective may be ¯nally
assumed when looking at the absolute advantages that every single sector is achieving from the
availability of cheaper factors in a di®erent location.
The use of two locations (rather than one) lowers aggregate marginal costs (as shown by the
slope of A2), but their co-ordination requires service links that imply ¯xed costs, 0A. This
would represent outsourcing within the country, and it could imply linking production blocks
within a single ¯rm or, alternatively, involve one ¯rm making arm's length arrangements with a
di®erent ¯rm in a di®erent location. Clearly, such fragmentation only becomes cost-e®ective if
output levels exceed 0D. Line segments 3 and 4 illustrate the increasing possibilities of decreasing
marginal costs if a greater degree of fragmentation is introduced, to take advantage of di®erences
in international factor prices and/or factor proportions among separate fragments. Of course,
such international fragmentation raises the costs of service links. The integrated minimum cost
schedule is shown by the heavy line, with increases in the degree of fragmentation occurring at
output levels D-F. This schedule presents increasing returns to scale.
2.4 Service link costs: a taxonomy
We have seen that fragmentation requires various costs including communication costs, trans-
portation expenses to link remotely located production blocks, coordination costs, and so on.
Table 1 lists the most notable components of service link costs. We divide the costs mainly into
four categories. The ¯rst category is made of trade costs, whose subcategories are based on
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004 [1]). Transportation costs and policy barriers have long been
the subject of many trade economists. Other factors in subcategories, however, remained much
less unexplored (Kimura and Takahashi, 2004 [24]).




transportation costs shipment charge, freight charge
policy barriers tari® barriers: ad valorem tari®, speci¯c tari®, non-tari® bar-
riers (quotas, others)
information costs search cost for sellers or buyers, research costs for preference
of foreign people
contract enforcement costs direct and indirect costs to make sure
costs associated with the use of
di®erent currencies
costs of exchange rate volatility, risk edge and uncertainty
legal and regulatory costs direct and indirect costs to deal with legal regulatory issues
and procedures
local distribution costs costs to utilise local infrastructure, and to e±ciently deliver
goods to local consumers
investment costs
policy barriers indirect costs due to prohibition to entry, absence of national
treatment, and other FDI discriminated measures
information costs search cost for suppliers
contract enforcement costs direct and indirect costs to make sure
legal and regulatory costs direct and indirect costs to deal with legal regulatory issues
and procedures
communications costs telecommunication costs, internet fee
coordination costs
timeliness indirect costs due to inadequateness of time delivery
uncertainty
indirect costs due to uncertainty regarding coordination of a
series of activities from production to shipment of end prod-
ucts
agglomeration
networking IT networking, business networking
cluster of suppliers accessibility to suppliers due to agglomeration e®ects
LocationAdvantages
cluster of homogeneous ¯rms externality
distribution costs reduction of distribution costs due to its nature of increasing
returns
concentration of similar types
of labour availability of workers thanks to agglomeration e®ects
low production costs
running costs
low level of wage, factor abundance (natural resources, land),
accessibility to imported intermediate with low tari® rate
¯xed costs accessibility to public utility (condition of infrastructure),
availability of productive workers
proximity to large mar-
kets
proximity to large markets in which there are many consumers
or customers
other geographical fea-
tures e.g. there is a suitable port for transit trade
Source: Kimura and Takahashi (2004, p. 31 [24])
The second category is made of investment costs. A ¯rm that locates production blocks
abroad normally operates through FDI. Therefore, any policy barrier and problem relating to
FDI adversely a®ect fragmentation. Indeed, investment-related issues seem particularly impor-
tant in developing countries, where restrictions are often consistent and often an obstacle for
the formation of international production/distribution networks.
The other two components, communications costs and coordination costs, have been much
less considered in the literature, in spite of their importance. These costs are associated with
the existence of production blocks in more countries. Recently, some components of these two
categories have been reduced, thanks to technological progress, while others remain.
There are thus many components in service link costs. Some are relatively easy to evaluate,
while others are di±cult even to identify. In any case, all components raise transaction costs and
hence determine the extent of the formation of international production/distribution networks.
Let us now consider two important points. Firstly, components of service link costs can be
divided into ¯xed costs and running costs; nevertheless the demarcation between the two is not
always clear. For example, transport costs and telecommunications costs are mostly running
costs, while information costs and investment barriers are more akin to ¯xed costs. The former
has been recently declining, due to trade liberalisation and the IT revolution. On the other hand,
the latter costs would be persistent. Secondly, the importance of service link costs signi¯cantly
varies across traded goods. If intermediate goods are traded many times within a network, trade
7costs become more important for trade in parts and components than for trade in ¯nal goods.
2.5 Two-Dimensional Fragmentation: A New Approach
The original idea behind fragmentation was related to the U.S.-Mexico back-and-forth produc-
tion sharing, where, typically, an American ¯rm exports parts and components to its a±liates
in Maquiladora for assembling and sends the ¯nished products back to the U.S., either to its
headquarters or to other a±liates. This phenomenon clearly appears as a typical example of
intra-¯rm, cross-border fragmentation in which ¯rms take advantage of di®erences in location
advantages, such as low wages and low-cost service links. This case is a very simple one, com-
pared to the more sophisticated structures of fragmentation emerging in East Asia. Indeed,
there seems to be some kind of new production/distribution networks involving the countries of
that region, especially for trade in part and components in machinery industries based on the
exploitation of di®erent location advantages. To study this problem Kimura and Ando (2005
[23]) proposed a measure of two-dimensional fragmentation based on geographical distance and
on uncontrollability.1 The former measure states that di®erences in location advantages are
exploited when the service link costs due to the geographical fragmented production block is
overcome, whereas the latter recalls the problems arising when fragmentation goes beyond the
boundary of the ¯rm, such as weaker managerial control. In this case the increase in service link
costs derives from uncontrollability, whereas \the reduction of production costs is generated by
de-internalisation advantages or the counterparts' ownership advantages" (Kimura and Ando,
2005, p. 318 [23]).
This two-dimensional approach can be portrayed as in Figure 5 in order to emphasise that
fragmentation may arise either with (intra-¯rm trade) IFT and arm's length transactions.
Figure 5: Two dimensions of fragmentation.
Source: Kimura and Ando (2005 [23], p. 319)
One axis represents \physical distance" between the original position and a new location of
the fragmented production block. Clearly when the distance is short and the fragmentation is
within the national border, this case can be labelled as \domestic fragmentation", otherwise it
will be \cross-border fragmentation". The other axis denotes the concept of \uncontrollability"
1The concept of uncontrollability is replaced with that of disintegration in a more recent work of Ando and
Kimura (2006 [3]).
8described above. Once the fragmented production block is beyond the boundary of the ¯rm, the
relationship becomes arm's length and it could be characterised by di®erent degrees in control-
lability: long-lasting outsourcing arrangements or subcontracting agreements might present a
signi¯cant level of controllability, whereas competitive spot bidding and internet auctions show
the lowest controllability.
The Authors studied the same phenomenon one year later (Ando and Kimura, 2006 [3]),
by looking into the nature and the evolution of service link costs along uncontrollability (now
disintegration) and distance, as indicated in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Another perspective of two-dimensional fragmentation.
Source: Ando and Kimura (2006 [3], p. 21)
We already pointed out that the economic elements determining service link costs and pro-
duction costs are di®erent between fragmentation along the distance axis and along the uncon-
trollability axis. More speci¯cally, if looking at fragmentation in terms of distance, there seems
to be nothing new, compared to the previous contributions stressing the role of transport, com-
munication and intra-¯rm coordination costs (indeed the arrows [i] and [ii] in Figure 6 show the
increase of service link costs due to distance from the original position). Conversely, location
advantages are the most important determinants that could lower the overall production costs,
such as the usual wage level di®erentials, factor/resource availability, technology transferability,
but also infrastructure services and the procurement of parts and components as well as host
country's policies.
Considering, instead, fragmentation along the controllability axis, additional service link
costs may arise from the loss of controlling grips over the fragmented blocks. They include costs
caused by incomplete information, lack of credibility, as well as the costs of losing contracts
without e®ective/e±cient dispute settlement mechanisms (see the arrows [iii] and [iv] in Figure
6). On the other hand, lowered marginal production costs may come from the counterpart's
ownership advantages, that is when the business partner has a better technology and/or a
special managerial ability in some production process; in this case outsourcing may reduce total
production cost (see Figure 6).
The emergence of strong economies of scale in the service link costs is one of the channels that
induces fragmentation over agglomeration: production blocks by many ¯rms tend to be placed
where service link costs are low. This channel is particularly signi¯cant when the host country
9for fragmented production blocks is a developing country, whose main steps towards progress
include improvement of economic infrastructure and policies to protect the environment.
Another channel is to use arm's length fragmentation alongside agglomeration: indeed some
transactions, such as procurement of customised parts and components, require frequent changes
of product speci¯cation as well as di®erent delivery times, suggesting a close location between
upstream and downstream ¯rms. If there are strong increasing returns to scale in service links,
this is likely to lead to strong fragmentation and high disagglomeration at ¯rm level, but this
will result in agglomeration at meso (aggregate level). In other words, once agglomeration
emerges, it becomes one of the strongest location advantages. Much more attention should be
devoted to this topic: indeed Jones and Kierzkowski (2005 [18]) emphasised that the process of
international fragmentation may not necessarily lead to disagglomeration, but rather to further
agglomeration.
Eventually, \once the critical mass of agglomeration is formed, it becomes one of the impor-
tant elements of location advantages for individual ¯rms considering fragmentation along the
distance axis. At the same time, the existence of various kind of potential business partners
generates opportunities for fragmentation along the uncontrollability axis. Such environment
also nurtures indigenous ¯rms penetrating into international production/distribution networks
once they gain competitiveness" (Kimura and Ando, 2005, p. 322 [23]).
A speci¯cation is nevertheless required on the nature of the service link costs arising, in this
new framework, both along the disintegration and the distance axis.
When a ¯rm decides to introduce intra-¯rm fragmentation, at industry level, fragmentation
and agglomeration may coexist. Indeed the concentration of fragmented production blocks
occurs at least through two di®erent channels (Ando and Kimura, 2006, p. 8 [3]).
² Both kinds of service link costs are not monotonic, and local minimal points of service
link costs tend to attract a large number of production blocks. These costs seem to be
of particular signi¯cance in cases of less developed countries, where each location meets a
di®erent investment climate.
² The concentration of production blocks may also take place due to the close relation-
ship between the service link costs along the disintegration (uncontrollability axis) and
geographical proximity as indicated in Figure 5. Obviously, the closer the distance with
business partners, the smaller the service link costs in searching potential business part-
ners, managing product quality, delivery timing, monitoring, and others. The northwest
area in Figure 7 is a typical example of this kind of agglomeration: here the concentration
of production blocks would lead to a reduction in the service link costs, and, this would
further attract other production blocks.
10Figure 7: Two kinds of service link costs.
Source: Ando and Kimura (2006 [3], p. 22)
2.6 From small to large: the networking of SMEs
The typical sequence experienced by Anglo-Saxons and Japanese MNEs,2 starts from vertical
integration, followed by international fragmentation, and eventually to horizontal agglomeration,
2This is the case of chips, that enter as input in several manufacturing processes, ranging from the computer
industry to the automotive sector. Clearly, the lower the speci¯city of the intermediate, the higher the chance
that the \incoming" industry is able to serve di®erent productions.
11whereas the formation of industrial clusters of SMEs, exploiting economies of agglomeration, is
closer to the experience of continental Europe, but also detectable all around the globe, included
Asia and the US.
In the ¯rst case, fragmentation of large MNEs might also lead to the creation of industrial
clusters in those regions where production blocks are placed. This is the case of East Asia,
where SMEs are involved in the disintegration of production. When dealing with arm's length
fragmentation, SMEs may consider the costs to collect information, understand local laws and
deliver to the foreign market too high, in comparison with local ¯rms. This is not true when the
distance with business partners is lower and, therefore, service link costs are lower. This happens
in searching potential business partners, consulting detailed specs of products, managing product
quality and delivery timing, solving disputes over contracts, monitoring. All these elements, that
we already discussed in the previous Sections, induce agglomeration and may lead to the creation
of a cluster of ¯rms. When a cluster has emerged, it often leads to further agglomeration.
In the second case, in some European countries, especially in Italy, but elsewhere as well,
industrial districts and the so-called local systems of production, historically represented a signif-
icant feature of the national economic systems. The formation of industrial districts specialised
in the production of a number of traditional products (textile, footwear, chairs, musical in-
struments, gloves, etc.) was said to be based on the share of a common knowledge, a certain
degree of socialisation of production, and a process of de-localisation from the most advanced
industrial areas, once dominated by the large ¯rms, who were put under strain by social unrest
and diseconomies of scale. In general, the success of Italian industrial districts - it was agreed
- derived from having been able to generate network economies as a result of a virtuous mix
of cooperation - on price setting - and competition - most notably in quality. This optimistic
vision came to an end by the late '90s, when external competition, especially from east Asia,
but also from other developed countries, put districts under a strong pressure. Taken separately,
each district ¯rm was unable to reach an adequate size to generate internal economies of scale
and found it di±cult to reach ¯nal markets, without the help of other connecting ¯rms. The
need to face domestic and international competition forced local enterprises to create some tools
to improve their market power. This happened through the formation of associations and/or
organisations (such as consortia), whose objective was to develop economies of scale and create
networks in production and distribution. Through these means the industrial district managed
to become, in some cases, an \integrated system of production", behaving - to some extent - as
if it was a single enterprise.3
3 Fragmentation: The Empirical Evidence
A recent work of Jones, Kierzkowski and Lurong (2005 [20]) checks the validity of the typical
hypothesis arising from international fragmentation, i.e. income growth, as well as lower prices
of service links, will lead to more fragmentation and more trade in parts and components.
Thanks to the database available in Ng and Yeats (2003 [34]), the Authors are able to study
the relationship between trade in parts and components, GDP and average business connection
charges, where each variable is referred to for NAFTA, EU and East Asia. According to the
econometric estimation, all variables show the expected sign. Speci¯cally, income coe±cients
have a positive and highly signi¯cant sign, whereas those related to service link costs are correctly
3Within the industrial district, ¯rms experience the share of knowledge, together with a concentration of
excellence on one hub of the network. This concept derives from the abundant literature on local production
systems whose overall study goes beyond the aim of this paper. Indeed, we wish to provide here just the
connections between this latter strand of scholarship and those phenomena, collaterally studied by fragmentation,
that emerge when di®erent SMEs integrate either vertically or horizontally. Actually, even though fragmentation
concentrates on horizontal agglomeration deriving from the disintegration of a MNE, the evidence of Italian
districts more frequently is concerned about vertical integration.
12negative and almost all extremely signi¯cant.4
These results allow the Authors to test the power of the fragmentation theory against the new
economic geography. According to the ¯rst approach, disagglomeration is to be expected in the
global economy, when it becomes larger, whereas the latter strand of literature conveys a message
that agglomeration is the norm in the presence of increasing returns to scale in manufacturing
when the scale of output increases. In this case disagglomeration prevails but this should not
be considered as a ¯nal result. Indeed, even though it has been often stated that international
fragmentation leads to disagglomeration, Jones and Kierzkowski (2005 [18]) admit that this
could not happen. In fact the presence of similar fragments of production across industries may
be aimed at improving technological and wider manufacturing abilities. This is for example the
case of electronic chips, which enter a wide spectrum of production processes. The same can
be said about the relationship between arm's length fragmentation and agglomeration for the
electric machinery in East Asia (Kimura and Ando (2005 [23]); Ando and Kimura (2006 [3],
2007 [4]).
3.1 Fragmentation in Europe
Baldone, Sdogati and Tajoli (2001 [8]) were among the ¯rst to present an empirical study on
the outsourcing of textile manufactures in the CEECs by ¯rms located in the Western Euro-
pean Countries. Focusing on fragmentation among countries, they assumed that the original
producer retains property rights over the intermediate products supplied to the subcontractor.
Empirically, they employ detailed trade data on outward processing trade5 as a proxy for frag-
mentation, whereas theoretically they need to specify the \comparative advantage" concept for
segment specialisation. They suppose that EU ¯rms do not chose to operate in countries simply
on the basis of pre-existing comparative advantages, but rather, on a more complex reasoning,
that sometimes goes beyond a sheer cost evaluation.
Baldone, Sdogati and Tajoli (2001 [8]) ¯nd support to this hypothesis. They develop a
regression model where the value of EU re-imports from a given country over the total value of
re-imports from the CEECs is the endogenous variable, whereas the explanatory ones include
wages in the CEECs, a set of variables used to indicate geographical and economic proximity
between trading partners, and some other variables representing CEECs' characteristics that
may favour location abroad of textile and apparel production. Results show that labour costs,
along with geographic and cultural proximity, are the most important reasons for choosing a
given country as a processing area.6 However, one has to remember that once a ¯rm ¯nds a
partner in a low wage country, factor cost evaluation is not the only point of reference. This
perspective is sometimes con¯rmed for those Italian ¯rms that have been searching for lower
production costs, to face the competition of new-comers from developing countries in mature
sectors, but not for those German ¯rms, for example, that invest in the CEECs in order to better
concentrate in the upstream phases of their value chain, where higher value added activities are
more feasible and appropriate for their own competitive advantage. To distinguish between the
two strategies, one has to look, indeed, not merely at the factor-cost saving of a decentralised
piece of production (which may be common to both strategies) but rather at what a ¯rm had in
mind in the ¯rst place, i.e. whether this move is a mean to the end of upgrading its positioning
or rather a defensive attempt to face aggressive new-comers on their terrain.
In any case, the ¯nal outcome of this research seems to con¯rm that once the processing-
abroad practice has started, EU ¯rms tend to concentrate in the up-stream segments of their
4Equivalent results are shown by an equation where the explanatory variables are the same of the previous
regression whereas the endogenous one is given by the ratio between the amount of trade in parts and components
and the whole trade exports pertaining to a particular region.
5Data on outward processing trade are from Eurostat, Comext CD-Rom, Intra-and-Extra-EU trade, classi¯ed
according to the Combined Nomenclature.
6Baldone, Sdogati and Tajoli (2002 [9]) obtained similar results in a later study.
13production process, rather than simply moving labour intensive segments to countries with lower
labour costs for defensive reasons. In this `vertical re-integration' in the processing country, FDI
may be playing an important role as they allow, through proprietary control, for a tighter su-
pervision of both processes and products. The nature of fragmentation in the textile/apparel
industry between EU and CEECs has been studied in details. Speci¯cally it seems that fragmen-
tation emerges both through arm's length transactions as well as by setting new plants abroad,
thus increasing IFT °ows. In any case, the results obtained by Baldone, Sdogati and Tajoli are
consistent with those reached a few years later by Ando and Kimura (2007 [4]) when studying
how manufacturing MNEs operates in CEECs through their a±liates.
Another interesting perspective, when studying fragmentation, is the one linking the stud-
ies of local production systems to their international expansion. Without entering into much
details, what can one say about the relationship between the fragmentation of large ¯rms and
the agglomeration of SMEs? Are perhaps fragmentation and agglomeration parts of a dual phe-
nomenon? Something like the two sides of the same coin? The answer is not in the a±rmative,
as MNE's tend to operate mostly via FDI, while SME's - according to the majority of studies -
tend to prefer collaborations and other, indirect, forms of internationalisation, such as non-equity
investments, joint ventures, technology transfers and a number of long term binding contracts.
In a nutshell, larger ¯rms, particularly MNEs, tend to operate in the CEECs through their own
a±liates, whereas the traditional features of SMEs, characterised by limited managerial and ¯-
nancial resources, are most likely to experience di®erent pattern of external growth and various
forms of collaborations with connected ¯rms. So, in general, the rule is that, given the variety
of ¯rms size and strategies, the growth of connected activities across international boundaries
and across ¯rm's boundaries may follow di®erent patterns: i.e emerge from horizontal and/or
vertical integration,7 collaborative agreements, or pure market transactions.
By entering the local territory as a key variable, Corµ o, Volpe and Bonaldo (2005 [11]) go
beyond this perspective and try to understand the mechanisms underlying the international
fragmentation of Italian production systems. They draw on the theoretical framework introduced
by Jones and Kierzkowski, but suggest a more eclectic approach. In particular they build on the
vast literature about the so called `industrial districts' as well as the most recent contributions
on the global value chains (Gere±, Humphrey and Sturgeon, 2005 [15]).
In their work, the speci¯c division of labour inside the so called `local production systems'
is explicitly considered to study fragmentation as a form of SMEs integration. They suppose
that it is the local market - rather than the market in general - that plays a crucial role in this
respect. This role emerge: 1) in the organisation of the supply chain; 2) in the integration of
di®erent production phases; and 3) in the correct match between the demand and supply of
intermediate goods. An additional hypothesis is that SMEs develop international linkages on
the basis of the local division of labour.
The technical possibility of dividing the value chain, together with variability and the dimen-
sion of intermediate markets, lead to the emergence of highly specialized local systems, trough
the exploitation of local based externalities. District ¯rms soon became leaders in their markets,
even in mature ones, by mixing competitive and cooperative behaviours. In doing so they are
often able to reach a very good performance in innovation activities, in the introduction of new
products, in the formation of new knowledge and in the creation of new employment. Unfortu-
nately industrial districts had to cope - recently - with a growing foreign competitive pressure,
which imposed a rede¯nition of their positioning in the global markets. They were forced to in-
crease their e±ciency and gain access to new knowledge. In particular, Corµ o, Volpe and Bonaldo
investigated whether the local productive fragmentation may have helped ¯rms to replicate the
home model overseas. The Authors argued that in the international disintegration of production,
7\...the productive integration is vertical when the °ows of goods between two economic regions regard two
consecutive phases of the same supply chain (i.e. export of tissue and import of apparel between Italy and
Romania)". (Corµ o, Volpe and Bonaldo, 2005, p. 8 [11]) Horizontal integration is said to take place, instead, when
¯nal goods are produced overseas to be exported into ¯nal markets.
14the Italian industrial districts tend to use less resource intensive tools and less FDIs, preferring
to embark in productive agreements and market transactions, involving less capital but more
trade °ows of intermediate goods. By analysing bilateral trade °ows, they managed to assess
the dimension of the fragmentation process, by looking at regional and provincial data. Despite
being very di®erent both in their pattern and trends, regional and provincial trade °ows con¯rm
the existence of a signi¯cant level of integration between some Italian areas and CEECs, as well
as with China and India. But, the former is typically of the `vertical type', while the latter
is typically of the `horizontal type' (see footnote 6). This is to say that Italian ¯rms tend to
delocalise just a few labour intensive phases of production to CEECs, for semi-¯nished products
to be further re-imported, and much more integrated pieces of production to the Far East, in
order to serve the ¯nal markets (either domestic or foreign).
The growing amount of trade in parts and components between EU member states and some
CEECs is also at the basis of the empirical work by Kaminski and Ng (2001 [119]). They used
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is EU's total external exports of manufactures (Kaminski and Ng, 2001, p. 24 [21]). \If the index
for a product exceeds unity, a country is said to have comparative advantage in the production
of good j because this sector is more important for this country than for EU exporters. If the
RCA index is below one, the country has a comparative disadvantage in EU markets for a good
j" (Kaminski and Ng, 2001, p. 24 [21]).
Such an index is used to study the level of integration experimented by CEECs in the
international fragmentation of production originated in Western ¯rms, over the years between
1989 and 19978. First results showed that:
² most CEECs have made signi¯cant e®orts in becoming competitive in EU markets for
parts. Although only two countries (Estonia and Hungary) had RCA index exceeding
unity in 1997, there was a signi¯cant increase in the values of RCA indices over 1989-1997
for other CEECs except Bulgaria;
² while no revealed comparative advantage in assembling was found in 1989, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia acquired it in 1993, and Poland and Estonia in
1997;
² the values of RCA both on imports and exports for some CEECs is similar to Malaysia and
Mexico's, countries that are highly integrated in the world production through Japanese
and U.S. MNEs respectively. This data seem to provide a positive prospect for the eco-
nomic development of CEECs in the enlarged Europe.9
A deeper investigation on the evolution of important sectors showed a strong process of
integration in the furniture value chain for most CEECs, whereas the automobile industry frag-
mentation involves only the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Some
8Data are from the UN COMTRADE Statistics.
9A high level of integration with EU economy is shown by the producers of Czech Republic, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Slovakia and Slovenia. Latvia and Lithuania appear yet to take advantage of opportunities o®ered by
fragmentation of production.
15involvement is also shown in the o±ce equipment and telecommunications by Estonia and Hun-
gary. Signi¯cantly, it is possible to de¯ne two di®erent groups of countries on the basis of their
comparative advantage. The ¯rst tier of CEECs economies (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) obtained high levels of integration, whereas the second tier (Bul-
garia, Romania, Latvia and Lithuania) appeared much less integrated. Indeed countries like
Czech Republic and Hungary accounted for one fourth and one third respectively on the total
trade of CEECs towards EU, as compared to the meagre 4% of Bulgaria or 10% of both Romania
and Lithuania.
3.2 Fragmentation in East Asia
Fragmentation of production in Europe appears quite simple, because only two di®erent paths
emerged. On one hand, EU countries locate some production blocks in some CEECs, paving
the ground for intra-¯rm and arm's length transactions, re-importing intermediates, and most
often, ¯nished products to o®er to the most developed market. On the other hand, yet on a
smaller scale, EU ¯rms also carry out highly-skilled production stages for American ¯rms.
A similar phenomenon takes place between Mexico and the U.S., where American ¯rms
export parts and components to their Mexican a±liates, which assembly, and eventually export
¯nal products back to America.
East Asia is actually an area where fragmentation shows major complexity. A ¯rst example of
the sophistication of the Asian model can be seen by comparing Figure 8 with Figure 9, showing,
respectively, the U.S.-Mexican case and the international expansion of Japanese MNEs.
16Figure 8: The typical maquiladora operation by the U.S. MNEs: an illustration.
Source: Ando and Kimura (2006 [3])
17Figure 9: The typical East Asian operation by Japanese MNEs: an illustration.
Source: Ando and Kimura (2006, pp. 19-20 [3])
18In general, fragmentation mostly involves the textile and the machinery industry. The former
plays a major role in Europe, whereas the latter is instead of greater signi¯cance in Asia. This
latter region, indeed, experienced faster export growth than any other part of the world in
machinery parts and components, which rose by more than 500% during the period 1987-2003.
As a result, in East Asia the share of exports in parts and components increased from 17% to
27% and the share of exports in machinery goods rose from 34% to 48%,. In general, East Asia's
share of world trade increased from 8% in 1997 to 25% in 2003.
East Asia intra-regional trade also grew substantially, thanks to a process of deep economic
integration. Even though fragmentation of Japanese MNEs involves a great number of ¯rms,
there is also some evidence of fragmentation of SMEs, both from Japan and East Asia as a
whole. Indeed, Japanese companies with less than 300 regular workers have greatly contributed
to the expansion of manufacturing activities, especially in developing Asian countries. This is
con¯rmed by the fact that more than 40% of Japanese ¯rms investing in East Asia are SMEs,
whereas the shares are much lower in North America and Europe (Kimura, Takahashi and
Hayakawa, 2007 [25]).
Yet, production and distribution networks in East Asia di®er with those of other areas
because of several reasons. Just to mention a few:
² they are very important in each economy of the region;
² they do not involve just some countries, but the majority of countries in Southern Asia;
² they are very complex, as they include both arm's length and intra-¯rm transactions,
depending on a number of elements we will try to outline below;
The reduction in service link costs is probably at the basis of this phenomenon. Indeed,
favourable environments for FDI in the region, a reduction in tari®s, as well as good infrastruc-
tures, were all signi¯cant determinants in the economic development of the Asian region.
Many countries in the area pursued export-oriented policies, allowing for the rise of FDI in
all sectors of the economy.
The reduction in tari®s and duties, especially those on machinery parts and components,
allowed SMEs to participate to international production networks. This occurred through the
reimbursement of taxes paid on goods sent abroad to be processed and then re-imported, in a
somewhat similar vain to what happens in Europe with the outward processing trade.
As concerns infrastructures, the area experienced great progress in maritime transportation
as well as in airport connection.
The great signi¯cance gained by fragmentation in the area had important e®ects in the
structure of intra-regional trade. We stressed how the machinery sector was the industry leading
the process of fragmentation. Statistics registered a great rise in the volume of IIT, that reached
almost half of regional trade in 2002. Trade in ¯nal products loose weight and trade in parts
and components rose, as we will discuss in the next paragraph.
3.3 Fragmentation and IIT in General
Just recently some scholars paid attention to the linkage between fragmentation and two-way
trade. For example, Jones, Kierzkowski and Leonard (2002 [19]) showed that international frag-
mentation often leads to the exchange of components within a vertically integrated production
process. If these fragments are classi¯ed in the same industry they will lead to trade that is
certainly intra-industry and possibly intra-¯rm.
Jones, Kierzkowski and Leonard (2002 [19]) studied this phenomenon in the television, au-
tomotive and apparel industries.
The production process of colour televisions is broken down into two di®erent phases, i.e. the
production of colour tubes and the assembly of television set. The former requires signi¯cant
19capital investment and is usually carried out in plants located in the U.S.A., whereas the latter
takes place in Mexican plants, thank to lower labour costs. This division of labour makes U.S.
¯rms to export a growing amount of cathode-ray picture tubes to Mexico, much higher than
Mexican exports of cathode-ray picture tubes towards U.S.A. When considering television sets,
instead, the opposite applies: Mexico becomes a net exporter, sending to the U.S. more than
ten times the value of television sets to the U.S.A. than are sent in the opposite direction. The
latter is a clear indication that the production of television sets is characterised by back-and-forth
transactions.
As a result, the overall amount of IIT for the whole sector is high (65%), and increased over
time, whereas the data concerning both cathode-ray tubes and television sets are low. Thus,
according to the Authors, data on IIT would be misleading to understand the inner features of
the sector as a whole. More correct would be to interpret trade between the U.S.A. and Mexico
on the basis of a classical Heckscker-Ohlin framework, with more emphasis on factor proportion
and factor prices.10
A similar phenomenon regards the automobile industry in North America, where specialisa-
tion in types of production process by region has been justi¯ed by the di®erences in the costs
of inputs, namely labour costs. This is especially the case of Mexico that now dominates the
production of engine castings and wire harnesses, which are both labour-intensive. If looking
at data on IIT the level of two-way trade for the whole sector it decreased from a 90% level at
the beginning of the '90s to 61% of 1999, whereas trade in parts rose from 67% to 85%. This
scenario is thus di®erent from the one concerning the television sector, whose fragmented nature
did not appear from the data, as fragmentation now does appear in the statistics of IIT.
Mexico is also a destination for the fragmentation of production in the apparel industry.
Thanks to the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act that allowed for the creation of free
trade zones, U.S. ¯rms tend to rely heavily on these facilities for the labour-intensive operations
in order to take advantage of lower labour costs. Signi¯cantly, the labour-intensive types of
apparel actually show the greatest growth in production sharing, thus suggesting that American
¯rms locate their production fragments mainly on the basis of their relative capital and labour
intensities.
In the study of North American trade °ows we need to pay attention to Canada, that is,
after the U.K., the second largest destination for U.S. FDI and, together with Mexico, the other
top production sharing partner with the U.S.A. The high degree of integration in the automo-
bile, aircraft and other industries is suggestive of the substantial contribution of fragmentation
between the U.S.A. and Canada. An interesting example regards trade in aircraft. Indeed, if
looking at IIT measures, the digits of the industry has a whole hide the true nature of two-way
trade, that is 81% in 1999 compared to a 51% of IIT just in ¯nal goods. Considering, instead,
parts and engines IIT measures reach 95% and 92%, respectively. This re°ects the scattering of
production fragments across the U.S.A. and Canada.11
3.4 Fragmentation and VIIT
Whereas the previous Subsection focused on the linkages between fragmentation and two-way
trade in general, this Subsection considers to what extent the international disintegration of
production processes might be empirically related both to (horizontal intra-industry trade) HIIT
and (vertical intra-industry trade) VIIT. Indeed some scholars paid attention to the link between
VIIT and fragmentation with particular reference to East Asian production networks (Ando,
2006 [2]; Athukorala and Yamashita, 2006 [7]).
From a theoretical viewpoint, VIIT `models' told a sort of \quality ladder" story in which
high-income countries export high-price, high-quality products, whereas low-income countries
10Nevertheless, and as stated above, the Ricardian comparative advantage cannot be neglected.
11Conversely, the fragmentation of production process involving the semiconductor industry does not appear
from the available data, that just only show high levels of IIT at aggregate level.
20export low-price, low-quality products. Therefore, most empirical studies on VIIT normally
consider vertically di®erentiated products as emerging only from di®erences in product quality.
But this is just a part of the story. According to Ando (2006 [2]) for example, unit price
di®erentials outside a certain range can be interpreted not only as re°ection of di®erences in qual-
ity, \but also of back-and-forth transactions with value-added embodied in vertically fragmented
production processes. Thus, the trade pattern categorised as VIIT in our decomposition-type
threshold method could re°ect international fragmentation within the same commodity cate-
gory" (Ando, 2006, p. 269 [2]). As a matter of fact, the exchange of products in vertically
fragmented production processes may not regard the same industry. Consider the exchange of
goods belonging to di®erent categories of the same industry as well as back-and-forth transac-
tions in vertically fragmented production processes, when commodity categories change between
imports and exports due to operations: in Ando's words, these are typical examples of one-way
trade.
Ando (2006 [2]) considered highly disaggregated data on machinery trade taking place in
East Asia from the beginning of the '90s until 2000. Speci¯cally, she computed measures of
both horizontal and vertical intra-industry and one-way trade for each machinery sector, i.e.,
general machinery, electric machinery, transport equipment and precision machinery as well as
for machinery trade as a whole. Moreover, and most importantly, she was able to identify trade
°ows in intermediates and parts taking place within the above commodity groups.
The empirical analysis showed ¯ve main results.
1. The signi¯cance of VIIT rose sharply, whereas the digit of one-way trade for overall ma-
chinery declined. At the beginning of the '90s the share of one-way trade was around
40-50%, with higher values expressed by Indonesia, and lower values by Hong Kong and
Singapore. These ¯gures decreased by a half in 2000 in most East Asian countries. As a
whole, the increase in IIT was due mainly to the sharp increase in VIIT, except for Korea
and Singapore.
2. The share of VIIT in machinery parts and components increased more rapidly than that
of VIIT in machinery products as a whole.
3. HIIT in machinery parts and components does not appear to be very important in East
Asia (except for the Philippines and Korea), contrary to what happens in Western Europe,
and the United States.
4. The sharp increase in VIIT was largely due to the expansion of back-and-forth transactions
in vertically fragmented production processes, in addition to IIT in quality-di®erentiated
commodities.
5. In the transport equipment sector, in which one-way trade is the main pattern of trade,
VIIT has gained signi¯cance through the years especially for parts and components trade.
According to Ando (2006 [2]) the prevalence of one-way trade may re°ect import substi-
tuting policies in many developing countries.
Results thus con¯rm the inconsistency of the \quality ladder" hypothesis driving VIIT.
Indeed most VIIT in lower-income countries does not systematically involve commodities with
export prices lower than import prices and most VIIT in higher-income countries does not
involve commodities with export prices higher than import prices. Indeed, some higher-income
countries import goods that are more expensive than those that they export; and some lower-
income countries export products that are more expensive than those that they import. This is
a clear con¯rmation of the importance of back-and-forth transactions in vertically fragmented
production processes.
This kind of phenomenon is quite similar to the one experienced by Western European
countries in their building of production networks in some CEECS, especially those outside the
21European Union, or at least, in the latecomers, as Bulgaria and Romania. Kaminsky and Ng
(2001 [21]) found indeed a con¯rmation of a scattering of the production processes between
richer European countries and those with lower GDP.
Ando (2006 [2]), as well as Kimura, Takahashi and Hayakawa (2007 [25]) stressed how VIIT
seems to be of greater signi¯cance in East Asian production networks rather than between West-
ern Europe and CEECs. Actually, this might be the case of trade involving Western European
countries only. Conversely, trade relationships between most western European countries and
some transition countries are expressed by signi¯cant values of VIIT, emerging not only from a
quality ladder explanation, but also from a high volume of back-and-forth transactions.
4 Fragmentation: So What?
The disintegration of production process emerges with the rise of marginal costs that a growing
¯rm faces. If service links to connect scattered production blocks are characterised by increasing
returns to scale, ¯rms may take advantage from fragmenting their production processes into
di®erent locations. The choice of a national or a foreign place, where to carry out operations,
depends of course on a wide variety of elements, the most important of which is probably the
local availability of the factor that is used more intensively in that particular production block.
The presence of economies of scale in transport costs is crucial to determine whether ¯rms
fragment or not. Provided that manufactures always present economies of scale, transport costs
may present either decreasing returns to scale (iceberg type) or increasing returns to scale. In the
¯rst case, ¯rms will gain from integrating, in the second case ¯rms will gain from fragmenting.
When economies of scale characterise both manufactures and service links, nothing can be said
in principle before assessing the relative importance of the two.
Fragmentation may take place either domestically or internationally, and may occur either
within the boundaries of a ¯rm or between independent ¯rms.
In Section 2.4 we provided a taxonomy of service link costs. We isolated four categories
related to trade, investment, communication and coordination costs, and, to a certain extent,
agglomeration, which could be considered as a service link, but also a source of location advan-
tage. The costs of service links increase with the extent of internationalisation and with arm's
length transactions. In both these cases there is not only room for outsourcing and subcontract-
ing relationships, but there are also chances for more complex linkages leading to agglomeration.
In the American and Japanese case we discussed how ¯rms tend to connect horizontally, by op-
erating in the same industry, and by supplying goods to companies in a vast array of di®erent
industries. Conversely, the European model is characterised - in general - by a higher agglom-
eration of consecutive phases of production and weaker horizontal connections among similar
sub-suppliers. In this case, ¯rms often belong to industrial districts, where they can bene¯t from
external economies of scale as a group but su®er from diseconomies of scale individually, due to
their small size. This lead companies to create vertically \integrated system of production" to
cope with ¯erce cost competition, especially from East Asia.
It is perhaps ironic that a somewhat opposite pattern of fragmentation a®ects MNEs in USA
and Japan and SMEs in Europe.
Evidence on fragmentation, from the European and East Asian experience shows that the
disintegration of production has taken place in both regions with increasing intensity during
the last decade, even though with di®erent patterns. Indeed, there seems to be a prevalence of
intra-¯rm fragmentation when Western European ¯rms delocalise in CEECs, whereas the Far
East case appears more complex. In East Asia, in fact, a thick web of sub-regional trade °ows
and inter-¯rm linkages does appear as stunning, thanks to allegedly lower service link costs in
Asia.
Taking into account the relationship between fragmentation and IIT we decided to distin-
guish between VIIT (when cross-border transactions leave the intermediate goods in the same
22commodity category) and one-way trade when the commodity category changes (within the
same industry). Unfortunately, we did not record any contribution on HIIT and fragmentation,
but we suppose that this combination can actually emerge when a previously integrated MNE
breaks up. In this case di®erent varieties of the same good might be traded internationally to
satisfy the consumers' love of variety.
So far for fragmentation itself. We will brie°y conclude this paper by providing some very
preliminary hints to connect fragmentation with the scholarship on Global Value Chain and on
Global Production-Distribution Networks.
5 Paths for Future Research: Fragmentation, Global Value Chains
and Global Production Networks
At a ¯rst glance, value chains and fragmentation may seem extremely di®erent, but at a closer
look, one can notice that they are two sides of the same coin. Fragmentation, in the ¯rst place,
is the mere consequence of the division of a previously integrated MNE, but, in the second
place is also a tool to interpret how \local production systems", made up of SMEs, behave
internationally.
Global value chains do not care only about MNEs, as they widely refer to \a sequence of
related and interdependent value added activities that can be performed by numerous enterprises
located in various locations worldwide" (Memedovic, 2008, p. 5 [33]). Such a clear picture do
include SMEs, clusters and industrial districts, and it can also be expanded to include regions.
Fragmentation, as we know, may take place within or outside the boundaries of the ¯rm, and
in the latter case, we stressed that there is room for agglomeration among independent agents,
which may take di®erent forms as provided in both Figures 5 and 7.
Yet, as fragmentation lies in the core of economics, it seems to be partly inadequate to under-
stand, by itself, what happens when looking at ¯rms' dynamics, and, speci¯cally, at inter-¯rm
relations. Conversely, the Global Value Chain and the Global Production Network approaches
seem instead appropriate to analyse a selected industry and a selected °agship ¯rm with its
local suppliers, respectively.
Recent preliminary research on this path is provided by Kimura (2008, [22]) who high-
lighted how the in-fashion \new" \new" international trade models of heterogeneous ¯rms do
not account for the sophisticated inter-¯rm relationships recently recorded in East Asia in the
machinery industry. The well-known bi-dimensional fragmentation framework is thus slightly
enriched to introduce four layers in terms of gate-to-gate lead time and frequency of delivery,
namely a local, a sub-regional, a regional and a world layer.
Notwithstanding, the contribution does not seem to bring such a novelty in the ¯eld, as it
argues that the heterogeneity in inter-¯rm relations is mainly explained by the transaction cost
approach, which is something pertaining to conventional wisdom.
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